The title for the Federalist Paper No. 3 is ‘The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence’, so naturally Jay brings in themes from No. 2. He begins by reiterating that the ‘conventional wisdom’ of Americans is that of the ‘importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.’ As a writer, I love his sly (although really quite obvious) flattery: ‘the Americans, intelligent and well-informed’, for whom he has ‘great respect.’
Jay finally gets to the meat of the matter in this Paper (I suppose No. 2 could be considered his introduction?). Jay states that the first goal of reasonable people: securing their safety. He notes that threats can come from ‘foreign arms and influence’, as well as domestic causes. He chooses here to discuss the former, by examining ‘whether… a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords… the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.’
Jay begins, not with the possible threats faced by America, but with a meditation on just and unjust wars. Instead of questioning which formulation of state (national federation vs. various permutations of confederacy and independent states) will best muster a defensive army, he asks which will be more likely to give just causes of war.
The more I think about this approach, the more it astounds me. I suppose that the question of the capability to form a winning army is not strictly necessary, as only four years early the Americans had defeated the British, one of the greatest military powers in the world. Still, as Jay notes later, even at this early date, America had already signed treaties with six foreign nations (Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Portugal and Prussia), with all but Prussia maritime nations capable of conducting both naval battles and landing troops on American shores. Furthermore, both Britain and Spain were neighbors, with colonies flanking to the North and South. So despite the existence of treaties, the threat of violence, even just as small incursions by guerilla groups, remained fairly high. And yet, the early focus of this Paper is the morality of the possible conflicts, not their military outcome. Jay only returns the discussion to the question of federation vs. confederation in the 7th paragraph:
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.
The question in my mind now becomes: could this be an example of the genesis of American exceptionalism? America has been characterized as special from the very beginning: Winthrop’s famous, “City upon a Hill” sermon was given in 1630 (no, Reagan didn’t use it first), but the sentiments expressed here seem more in line with a rejection of Europe’s realpolitik. And yes, while I’ve known for quite some time that American foreign policy is often presented as idealistic and, if not more cooperative, than at least less expedient than that of ‘Old Europe’. (I think Kissinger’s Diplomacy devotes a whole chapter to Wilson’s perfection of this stereotyping of foreign policy). But I didn’t think, or at least had forgotten, that the idea started so early. However, Jay’s recommendations, while internationalist in nature, and morally-driven (really, state structure decided on the basis of the likelihood of venturing into a just war?), are no less self-serving than Bismarck’s. It’s just that Jay defines the good of the state differently. Bismarck and other realists view the national interest as roughly: territorial control and integrity, military and economic security, ready ability to project national power, and the means to increase and expand those components. Ok, excellent. Those measures make sense, given the world in which they developed. Jay doesn’t address those issues, at least not here. Here is his logic:
A national government is more efficient, and more appealing to men of character, who will then ‘not only consent to serve, but will also generally be appointed to manage it,’ and furthermore, these officials will be the best of the best, because a broader pool (the whole country vs. the individual state) will bring more qualified applicants together, and from there the people will be able to chose the MOST qualified: ‘[a] more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government….’ The result will be a government that is ‘more wise, systematical, and judicious’ than the individual states can afford, and consequently: 1. Other nations will be more satisfied with our leadership, and 2. American citizens will be safer, presumably as the enlightened government will respect our rights and security, and so work harder to secure both. He further argues this point in the next paragraph: under a national government, laws, both domestic and international (treaties) will apply equally to all citizens; judges will have consistent standards of appointment as well as enforcement of rulings, and so on. This is known as the ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause’ of the Constitution. Great, glad to have it. But what about those foreign forces and influences?
Well, all those temperamental little states, especially the borders states, might be tempted to ‘swerve from good faith and justice’, by, perhaps, picking a fight with Britain or Spain, or the Indian nations (I really love Jay’s statement that ‘Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions by the present federal government- here he means the confederate government under the Articles- the ‘feeble as it is’ is the clue’. He’s right, but oh so innocent). Even if the state leadership rejects the temptation, the state’s citizens may not. However, the state may not have the means, or truthfully, the desire, to punish those wayward citizens, and since these things have a way of spreading, suddenly there is another war on the continent, between, say, Maine, and Britain. Good going!
All of this makes a lot of sense- while there can be (especially in the realist school of thought) good reasons for inviting war, most people don’t usually want to. Jay’s logic is sound, if his paragraphs are occasionally a bit hard to follow. And again, by rejecting the discussion of wars prompted by intemperate grievances, Jay implies that this nation will literally chose its battles differently. He doesn’t explicitly dismiss realist reasons for war (presumably wars fought for the expansion of territory or national power aren’t intemperate), but he does imply, or at least allow the audience to infer, that those arguments will not influence national policy. American exceptionalism again.
Jay finishes this Paper by finally addressing the compelling argument that national unity = national strength. If the national government does get drawn into a conflict started wrongly by a state, America’s internal unity, and consequent strength, will be in a better position to offer ‘acknowledgements, explanations and compensations’. Little states are forced into pardon and humiliation by powerful nations, as Jay illustrates with the example of Genoa in 1685.
But why did Jay spend so much time discussing just vs. unjust wars? Where is the national interest? I feel that that little train of argument, so discussed in the first part of the Paper, doesn’t quite arrive in time for the end of it.
I can read into the text, and argue that not only will a national government be more temperate and so less likely to pick unprovoked fights, when it is forced into war by the aggressions of another state (defense is considered a just cause of war), it will have the court of public opinion on its side. But Jay doesn’t deliver that argument himself. He takes it for granted that just wars, and ensuring that those are the only type of war fought, are a sound argument. Which, hey, we’re Americans, so he’s not entirely wrong. But where does this attitude come from? Our religious and civil policies are already different from Britain; this we know, this is why we were founded. But when does the rejection of realist national military and diplomatic policy occur? Perhaps I’ve missed it and it’s no longer an issue by the time of the Constitution and Federalist Papers. I think not though. These Papers are part of the debate about American government and identity. Foreign policy intentions certainly fall into that.
I don’t think this topic is exhausted yet. Now I’m really curious as to what else I’ll find in the rest of the Papers.