Pursuing the Global Common Good

One thing I love about being in DC is the opportunity to attend countless policy events. I try to attend a fair number, on a variety of subjects and so far I've been fairly lucky in their quality. One in particular stands out, not for its stunning brilliance, but rather for the opposite. I studied religion and ethics in international relations in college, so I was particularly excited about the Center for American Progress' event 'Pursuing the Global Common Good' to launch their report of the same name. Instead, I was sorely disappointed.

The event itself wasn't bad, just unoriginal and mediocre, prompting me to tell a friend later: 'If you've seen heard one lecture on morality in the practice of foreign policy goals, you've heard them all.' Still, I held out hope for the report. Some ideas and thoughts don't translate well into events; the report would present each position as it was intended. Sadly, length and thoughtfulness of presentation do nothing positive; rather the sense of a missed opportunity only heightens the disappointment.

Pursuing the Global Common Good is intended as a reader, particularly for those who respond to the call of religion moral teachings. While the report also explores secular moral reasoning, the central arguments stem primarily from the Abrahamic religions. Not surprising, considering the book is in part the work of the Faith and Progressive Policy Initiative at the CAP. Each essay examines an important international issue, treating it within the context of current affairs. The intent is to outline a multifaceted and holistic ethical foreign policy. In that vein, it suggests that there is a role for morality and ethics in the theory and practice of foreign policy, and by extension, a place for peoples of faith within the ranks of policy makers. As a libertarian, I have every interest in maintaining the separation of church and state. But this provision in the Constitution was not meant to exclude people of faith from the practice of statecraft, or even to force them to discount their moral views learned from religious instruction. Indeed, the Founding Fathers were religious men, and their belief that 'all men are created equal' (my emphasis) in God's image, with His Spirit, infuses the American system's logic of inalienable rights, even if Biblical teachings are not cited directly. Plus, since I was a religion minor, from a personal/academic standpoint, I was ready for a good debate. Unfortunately, PtGCG has serious substantive and analytical flaws. While I haven't addressed each essay, most of the specific sources of my disappointment are detailed below.

Introduction I have to say, I think the Introduction was my favorite chapter. Part of the reason I studied anthropology and religion as an IR major was that I am fascinated by concepts of identity (individual and communal) and the influences they have on policymaking. I was especially taken by the appearance of ubunto, a word I became familiar with while writing my thesis. I think it is a fascinating concept, and really enjoyed the author's effort to open it to debate for Western audiences. At some point, my attempt to write about the Introduction developed into an outline for an essay on communalism and liberalism (sample discussion questions: Is individualism inherently modern? Can communalism sometimes be modern?) In the interest of staying on point, I decided to set aside the ubunto piece. It's still in development, but I'll post when its done.

Pursuing the GCG (Title Essay) Each section is more like a set of bullet points. While I can't (and probably wouldn't) argue with any of the points specifically, in total they come across more as many good points set in an outline (not even necessarily in best order) to be written into a longer paper. Unfortunately, all we are presented with is the outline, and not the thesis. There is the requisite Darfur paragraph (not to in any way diminish the events in Darfur, but what about Niger a few years ago, or Somalia even now? Or the Congo, past, present, and possibly forever?- to name just a few. If we're going to be serious about stopping genocide and human rights violations, then lets' actually acknowledge all of them, not just the popular ones). I understand that one of the authors is a Ph.D student at Georgetown, but couldn't he have produced something more than an outline?

Forging a Response to Climate Change: Why Communities of Faith Are Essential
I will admit that I was thrilled to see a section entitled 'The Federal Response' in the essay on global warming; although this work is aimed at an American audience, perhaps, in recognition that this is an international issues, and falls under the jurisdiction of several international governmental organization, the authors meant the US response as one state in a larger (global) system?! Sadly, my hopes were dashed. The authors mean Presidential and Congressional policy responses. Which leads me to a temporary digression for a rant:

In a federation (such as the US), they are ALL 'federal' levels. What the authors meant to say was 'national', as in, 'of the nation.' I don't expect everyone to always get it right, but there are some who should really know better (here's looking at you Washington Post).

A Faithful Case for Intervention: Our Common Responsibility to Protect Humanity and Prevent Atrocities
In this essay, one section discusses the problem of ‘Protecting People under Threat.’ The author, Dr. Elizabeth Ferris, informs the reader that

most of the debate about the responsibility to protect has focused on the use of military force. The International Commission’s impressive work on the responsibility to protect includes many pages of possible actions that can be taken… but most attention has focused on when a military response should be initiated. Yet intervention can be seen on a continuum.

She goes on to list non-military interventions:

fact-finding missions, promises of new assistance or withdrawal of assistance, diplomatic demarches, disinvestment or economic sanctions, monitoring by human rights monitors, police action, deployment of military force, and many others.

And yes, she is correct; there are many ways and means of intervening internationally without resorting to ‘boots on the ground.’ And the authors of Responsibility to Protect do an excellent job of discussing those options. But I think that part of the reason for the focus on the military option is that countries are so loathe to use it. Diplomacy, disinvestment and sanctions are all well-used tools in the international community’s belt (read about the controversy over ‘smart’ sanctions here), with varied results, precisely because they are not military options. Most politicians look first to those options so that they can give the appearance (and occasionally actuality) of acting, without invoking the generally unpopular option of use of force. So, for those who are concerned with preventing genocide and other violations of human rights, more emphasis must be given to military solutions, in order to force a debate on a country’s true level of commitment. All options must be of course discussed, but there are situations in which the use of force is no longer an option, it is a necessity. Rwanda was such a case. Kosovo as well. Darfur has proven itself to also fall into this category. In fact, whenever the threat of genocide is real (whether or not the politicians actually label it as such), we must use force must to prevent it. Economic sanctions are not strong enough. For someone claiming to write a ‘Faithful Case for Intervention,’ I am surprised by Ferris’ failure to honestly discuss the arguments for military intervention. Instead, her superficial mention of the idea seems instead intended to dissuade the reader from supporting the use of force. I am disappointed by her treatment of the subject; I feel that it is almost dishonest. After all, St. Augustine essentially invented the notion of ‘just warfare’, under which the prevention of genocide morally, and legally (1948 International Convention against Genocide- mentioned a page earlier in Ferris’ article) falls.

I generally think that the emphasis of this report may have been a bit off. While keeping in mind that this aims to encourage communities of faith to produce global citizens, CAP is a secular organization, and it is from that perspective that many of its supporters arrive. This work should be a means to: 1. Persuade a secular audience to welcome faith-based actors in to foreign policy on the basis of their common goals and 2. Strengthen the arguments facing secular actors who may disregard (or are pushed away by) realist concerns but are attracted to moral appeals. PtGCG really does neither.

PtGCG is a truly promising abstract, but as a finished piece, it fails to deliver. I expect this quality from undergraduates (of which I was one not all that long ago), but not from graduate students and experienced practitioners. I really hope this is not the CAP's final work on the matter, because it is an important discussion to have in US politics. But we, the American people, deserve, and desperately need, a real debate, with all sides honestly and fully represented. One of my favorite lines from the West Wing is from 'Let Bartlet Be Barlet' in the first season: 'We're going to raise the level of public debate in this country and let that be our legacy'. Why does it take a television show to subscribe to that purpose?! Americans aren't stupid, or apathetic (just overwhelmed). But how can we expect to lead the "free world" if we don't actually discuss what that leadership entails?

Thats really more than I had ever intended to write about this report, so I think I'll stop. I will have to revisit some of the topics discussed here (the Introduction in particular) so those will appear in due time.

Federalist Paper No. 3

The title for the Federalist Paper No. 3 is ‘The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence’, so naturally Jay brings in themes from No. 2. He begins by reiterating that the ‘conventional wisdom’ of Americans is that of the ‘importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.’ As a writer, I love his sly (although really quite obvious) flattery: ‘the Americans, intelligent and well-informed’, for whom he has ‘great respect.’

Jay finally gets to the meat of the matter in this Paper (I suppose No. 2 could be considered his introduction?). Jay states that the first goal of reasonable people: securing their safety. He notes that threats can come from ‘foreign arms and influence’, as well as domestic causes. He chooses here to discuss the former, by examining ‘whether… a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords… the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.’

Jay begins, not with the possible threats faced by America, but with a meditation on just and unjust wars. Instead of questioning which formulation of state (national federation vs. various permutations of confederacy and independent states) will best muster a defensive army, he asks which will be more likely to give just causes of war.

The more I think about this approach, the more it astounds me. I suppose that the question of the capability to form a winning army is not strictly necessary, as only four years early the Americans had defeated the British, one of the greatest military powers in the world. Still, as Jay notes later, even at this early date, America had already signed treaties with six foreign nations (Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Portugal and Prussia), with all but Prussia maritime nations capable of conducting both naval battles and landing troops on American shores. Furthermore, both Britain and Spain were neighbors, with colonies flanking to the North and South. So despite the existence of treaties, the threat of violence, even just as small incursions by guerilla groups, remained fairly high. And yet, the early focus of this Paper is the morality of the possible conflicts, not their military outcome. Jay only returns the discussion to the question of federation vs. confederation in the 7^th paragraph:

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

The question in my mind now becomes: could this be an example of the genesis of American exceptionalism? America has been characterized as special from the very beginning: Winthrop’s famous, “City upon a Hill” sermon was given in 1630 (no, Reagan didn’t use it first), but the sentiments expressed here seem more in line with a rejection of Europe’s realpolitik. And yes, while I’ve known for quite some time that American foreign policy is often presented as idealistic and, if not more cooperative, than at least less expedient than that of ‘Old Europe’. (I think Kissinger’s Diplomacy devotes a whole chapter to Wilson’s perfection of this stereotyping of foreign policy). But I didn’t think, or at least had forgotten, that the idea started so early. However, Jay’s recommendations, while internationalist in nature, and morally-driven (really, state structure decided on the basis of the likelihood of venturing into a just war?), are no less self-serving than Bismarck’s. It’s just that Jay defines the good of the state differently. Bismarck and other realists view the national interest as roughly: territorial control and integrity, military and economic security, ready ability to project national power, and the means to increase and expand those components. Ok, excellent. Those measures make sense, given the world in which they developed. Jay doesn’t address those issues, at least not here. Here is his logic:

A national government is more efficient, and more appealing to men of character, who will then ‘not only consent to serve, but will also generally be appointed to manage it,’ and furthermore, these officials will be the best of the best, because a broader pool (the whole country vs. the individual state) will bring more qualified applicants together, and from there the people will be able to chose the MOST qualified: ‘[a] more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government….’ The result will be a government that is ‘more wise, systematical, and judicious’ than the individual states can afford, and consequently: 1. Other nations will be more satisfied with our leadership, and 2. American citizens will be safer, presumably as the enlightened government will respect our rights and security, and so work harder to secure both. He further argues this point in the next paragraph: under a national government, laws, both domestic and international (treaties) will apply equally to all citizens; judges will have consistent standards of appointment as well as enforcement of rulings, and so on. This is known as the ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause’ of the Constitution. Great, glad to have it. But what about those foreign forces and influences?

Well, all those temperamental little states, especially the borders states, might be tempted to ‘swerve from good faith and justice’, by, perhaps, picking a fight with Britain or Spain, or the Indian nations (I really love Jay’s statement that ‘Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions by the present federal government- here he means the confederate government under the Articles- the ‘feeble as it is’ is the clue’. He’s right, but oh so innocent). Even if the state leadership rejects the temptation, the state’s citizens may not. However, the state may not have the means, or truthfully, the desire, to punish those wayward citizens, and since these things have a way of spreading, suddenly there is another war on the continent, between, say, Maine, and Britain. Good going!

All of this makes a lot of sense- while there can be (especially in the realist school of thought) good reasons for inviting war, most people don’t usually want to. Jay’s logic is sound, if his paragraphs are occasionally a bit hard to follow. And again, by rejecting the discussion of wars prompted by intemperate grievances, Jay implies that this nation will literally chose its battles differently. He doesn’t explicitly dismiss realist reasons for war (presumably wars fought for the expansion of territory or national power aren’t intemperate), but he does imply, or at least allow the audience to infer, that those arguments will not influence national policy. American exceptionalism again.

Jay finishes this Paper by finally addressing the compelling argument that national unity = national strength. If the national government does get drawn into a conflict started wrongly by a state, America’s internal unity, and consequent strength, will be in a better position to offer ‘acknowledgements, explanations and compensations’. Little states are forced into pardon and humiliation by powerful nations, as Jay illustrates with the example of Genoa in 1685.

But why did Jay spend so much time discussing just vs. unjust wars? Where is the national interest? I feel that that little train of argument, so discussed in the first part of the Paper, doesn’t quite arrive in time for the end of it.

I can read into the text, and argue that not only will a national government be more temperate and so less likely to pick unprovoked fights, when it is forced into war by the aggressions of another state (defense is considered a just cause of war), it will have the court of public opinion on its side. But Jay doesn’t deliver that argument himself. He takes it for granted that just wars, and ensuring that those are the only type of war fought, are a sound argument. Which, hey, we’re Americans, so he’s not entirely wrong. But where does this attitude come from? Our religious and civil policies are already different from Britain; this we know, this is why we were founded. But when does the rejection of realist national military and diplomatic policy occur? Perhaps I’ve missed it and it’s no longer an issue by the time of the Constitution and Federalist Papers. I think not though. These Papers are part of the debate about American government and identity. Foreign policy intentions certainly fall into that.

I don’t think this topic is exhausted yet. Now I’m really curious as to what else I’ll find in the rest of the Papers.