Federalist Paper No. 4

In retrospect, Jay’s emphasis in No. 3 on just and unjust wars really was about not giving other nations just cause against America, through foolish actions on the part of individual states or citizens. Jay’s first line in No. 4 is clearer: ‘[the] just causes of war given to other nations’ (my emphasis).

Still, the second paragraph reaffirms my argument that Jay rejects- at least in the public formation of policy- the practices of realpolitik, and war as politics by other means. He doesn’t ignore that realism is a compelling theory of international relations, with powerful players, but he does diminish its legitimacy, calling the practice ‘disgraceful’ to human nature. I do think Jay- all the Founders, really- is trying to move America in a more idealistic direction, by redefining national interest to coincide more firmly with international interest. It’s a barely nascent line of thinking, but one that prevails throughout American political literature, and illustrated by history.

Returning to the Paper.
Jay warns Americans that not only do they need to protect themselves against causing unjust war, but also aggressors in unjust wars. If you remember, in No. 3, Jay fixed the causes of just war as primarily rising from the violation of treaties or direct violence- attack. Under this definition, those who would seek to use force to secure other goals would not have just cause.

Jay gives specific examples, drawn primarily from the pursuit of trade advantages. He mentions rivalries over fisheries (Britain and France) and navigation and shipping (most of the powers of Europe), particularly in shipping to China and India. Now, most people today would suggest using trade sanctions, quotas, subsidies and other mechanisms of economic soft power to diminish America’s advantage. Indeed, mercantilism was a well-understood economic policy, but it was seen more as a means to grow a nation’s wealth (and therefore military potential), rather than project power over other nations. However, and I could definitely be wrong about this; American history wasn’t my preferred topic of study in school; military power was still the primary tool of foreign influence. I’m pretty sure that is what Jay fears here, in part because of his early references to war, and also because he mentions Spain blocking the Mississippi and Britain the St. Lawrence, both of which could only be done and maintained- and defeated- by military might.

In such situations, with such inducements to war, the ‘best possible state of defense’ depends on the ‘government, the arms, and the resources of the country.’ And what form of government, what means of control of arms and resources, could best defend the country? Why, a unified national federation of course!

Jay’s arguments for unification:

1. Broader and deeper pool of resources- human, capital, natural, vegetable, animal, mineral. Not only the best leaders (Jay discussed peace/pre-war time leaders in No. 3, but focuses more on war time leaders here), but the best soldiers, and of course the necessary resources for war. (Paragraph 12)
2. Central authority for mobilizing, distributing and organizing resources- primarily military. (Paragraphs 12-16)
3. Central authority creating regulation- primarily for markets: trade, capital, credit, etc. Established, regulated, and stabilized markets strengthen the so-called “soft power” of a nation. (Mentioned in the last paragraph)

Pretty straightforward, with few surprises. These are the arguments I expected all along. But I’m definitely glad for where Jay took the last Paper.

One Paper left on the Dangers of Foreign Force and Influence: No. 5. Coming Shortly.