Federalist Paper No. 7

Poor Hamilton. He wishes he could just leave the question of what could make the states fight each other, at just: the same reasons every other group of states has ever fought against one another. But he needs to address the particulars of the American situation, so his ink can’t be spared.

The reasons he addresses are:

1. Territorial disputes (par. 2-4)
2. Competitions of commerce (par. 5-6)
3. Public debt of the Union (par. 7-8)
4. Laws in violation of private contracts (par. 9)

As he states, reasons 1 and 2 aren’t unique to America, but he does have reason to argue that 3 and 4 are.

By ‘public debt of the Union’, Hamilton refers primarily to the accumulated war debt. There are two problems he sees with leaving this debt to be dealt with by the single states:

1. The apportionment of debt: The different states accumulated different losses and costs based on their role in the Revolutionary war (heavier losses of human life, destruction of property, interruption of trade), in the pursuit of the common good – independence. How, then should the costs be apportioned – by the ability of each state to pay, by costs that were not paid out at the time, etc? Each state will obviously want to minimize its debt.
2. How to discharge the debt: Apparently, members of some of the states ‘either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question’ to paying ANY of the debt. On the other side, there are citizens who are creditors to the Revolutionary army and young nation, and really want to be paid back. Not to mention, some countries (France) lent the Americans money, and not paying back allies is a sure-fire way to make any support disappear.

The final point Hamilton raises is ‘laws in violation of private contracts’. I don’t follow this quite as easily, but my understanding is that a citizen of one state enters into a contract with a citizen of another state, after which the legislature of the first state passes some law that violates the contract between the two citizens, and injures the citizen of the second state. And since the citizen of the second state’ rights are violated, then his state will have to act to protect him, and now suddenly two states are having a go over this contract and the interfering law. In his example of Connecticut and Rhode Island, it almost seems as if Rhode Island’s legislature passed laws that would harm citizens of Connecticut on purpose, which doesn’t seem like a very neighborly thing to do. Or as Hamilton puts it, a ‘[breach] of moral obligation and social justice.’ (On a side note, no wonder he got into a duel with Aaron Burr)

As always, Hamilton says it better than I. From his conclusion:

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers…[T]his conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by…feeble tie… [would] be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions… would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers… Divide et impera must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.

Federalist Paper No. 6

Hamilton begins his second Federalist Paper with a brief review of the “innumerable” ‘causes of hostility among nations’. He also makes the rather snarky comment that

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other.

In other words, the idea of peace between separate or confederated states is a pipe dream.

I have to say, Hamilton was not the most optimistic guy. He had an unfailing lack of faith in people (and apparently, especially in women: ‘The influence which the bigotry of one female, the petulance of another, and the cabals of a third, had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.’). So, with this in mind, it’s not really surprising that he spends most of this Paper detailing historical evidence for the greed, vagaries and perfidies of people and states throughout history. He also rightly points out that it is not only statesmen who may determine a state’s peace, but the average citizen as well. He invokes recent (for him) history: Daniel Shays and his Regulators, noting, ‘If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.’

I should also probably note that despite Hamilton’s misgivings about statesmen, he concluded the ideal form of government had represented all the interest groups, but maintained a hereditary monarch to decide policy. In Hamilton's opinion, this was impractical in the United States; nevertheless, the country should mimic this form of government as closely as possible. He proposed, therefore, to have a President and elected Senators for life (surprising, really, that TJ and Madison couldn’t stand him).

I confess that I misread the seventh and eighth paragraphs the first three times. I thought that Hamilton was arguing that despite all of this, however, there is still hope! (which should have been my first clue that I was mistaken). In actuality, he says that visionary men ‘stand ready to advocated the paradox of perpetual peace between the States’ (written eight years before Kant’s Perpetual Peace). They argue that ‘Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other’: the Enlightenment Era version of the ‘Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention.’

Hamilton counters that republics, even commercial republics, are still just as likely to get into wars. Commerce, instead of eliminating causes of war, simply provides other incentives: war as commerce by other means. As evidence, he cites Sparta, Athens, Rome, Carthage – ‘the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction’, Venice, Holland, Britain, Austria, Bourbon, France, England and France involved in Austria vs. Bourbon, etc. In essence, if separate, composed as neighbors, states will fight. Here, he doesn’t offer any explicit evidence that states won’t fight even if they are united (and in fact his mentions of North Carolina’s revolt, the ‘late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania’ and the insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts makes me wonder that states will become embroiled in violence no matter what), except to quote Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, l’Abbé de Mably:

NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors.

The quote sums up the Paper nicely, as Hamilton notes with his final line: “This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY,” which I must assume he addresses in the next Paper, as there are only the two on Dissensions between the States.

Federalist Paper No. 5

Jay recaps the general argument of the first set of Federalist Papers in paragraph two: ‘that weakness and divisions at home [will] invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing [will] tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves.’ In this last in the series on the Dangers from Foreign Force and Influences, Jay invokes the union of England and Scotland (part of what makes it the United Kingdom), the example with which the former colonists were ‘in general the best acquainted.’ He begins with Queen Anne’s appeal to the Scottish Parliament in 1706 to accept the proposed union. The predicted benefits:

An entire and perfect union… will secure… religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst [Scottish clans and regions], and the jealousies and differences betwixt [the] two kingdoms. It must increase… strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined… will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES.

In contrast, Jay reminds the reader of the island’s history before the union: divided into three nations, ‘almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.’ Despite their shared interests and common cause, at least with respect to the ‘continent’- Europe-, instead, mutual jealousies, often nursed by their very enemies in Europe, kept the island divided.

He then returns specifically to America. He asks directly: if America is divided into three or four different nations (confederations; we’ve already tried and failed at 13 individual states), won’t the result be the same as in Britain? Although he couches it in terms of ‘envy’, what Jay is really describing in the fifth through seventh paragraphs is the possibility of unstable balance of power, resulting in an arms or trade race, but importantly, ‘formidable only to each other.’ Not exactly a future worthy of a country that defeated Britain.

Jay also addresses the possible counter-argument, that the confederacies will form defense unions. He challenges the reader to name such a time when the independent states combined in an alliance and united their forces against a foreign enemy. This line actually confuses me. Wasn’t that what they did with the Revolutionary War? Perhaps Britain wasn’t a foreign enemy, because it was the colonizing power?*

He also raises the point that should the confederacies go to war with each other, they may be tempted to reach out to foreign nations for assistance, but these powers, once received, could then turn on their American allies to conquer, as the Romans did millennia before.

Jay debates the subject of the Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence through four consecutive Papers. His work sometimes tiptoes this side of specious, being more convinced of his own rightness than in presenting a fully fledged argument, but, especially in the latter Papers, with their wealth of historical examples, he does present a strong argument.

This is also the last of Jay until Paper No. 64, when he returns to discuss the Powers of the Senate. Next, we’ll explore the problem of Dissensions between the States, and reintroduce Alexander Hamilton.

* A friend offers this interpretation: "I think he is asking, rhetorically, when Britain and Spain, which had formerly been divided (Britain consisted of Scotland, Wales, etc., and before that England was just the name of land mass that contained the kingdoms of Mercia, Wessex, Northumbria, etc., and before it was united Spain contained Aragon and other kingdoms) opted to form the loose kind of confederation that anti-Federalists preferred. The answer, he implies, is that they did not. They formed strong unions that allowed them to repel foreign invaders."

So, basically a restatement of his previous points, with more historical evidence.