Federalist Paper No. 6

Hamilton begins his second Federalist Paper with a brief review of the “innumerable” ‘causes of hostility among nations’. He also makes the rather snarky comment that

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other.

In other words, the idea of peace between separate or confederated states is a pipe dream.

I have to say, Hamilton was not the most optimistic guy. He had an unfailing lack of faith in people (and apparently, especially in women: ‘The influence which the bigotry of one female, the petulance of another, and the cabals of a third, had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.’). So, with this in mind, it’s not really surprising that he spends most of this Paper detailing historical evidence for the greed, vagaries and perfidies of people and states throughout history. He also rightly points out that it is not only statesmen who may determine a state’s peace, but the average citizen as well. He invokes recent (for him) history: Daniel Shays and his Regulators, noting, ‘If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.’

I should also probably note that despite Hamilton’s misgivings about statesmen, he concluded the ideal form of government had represented all the interest groups, but maintained a hereditary monarch to decide policy. In Hamilton's opinion, this was impractical in the United States; nevertheless, the country should mimic this form of government as closely as possible. He proposed, therefore, to have a President and elected Senators for life (surprising, really, that TJ and Madison couldn’t stand him).

I confess that I misread the seventh and eighth paragraphs the first three times. I thought that Hamilton was arguing that despite all of this, however, there is still hope! (which should have been my first clue that I was mistaken). In actuality, he says that visionary men ‘stand ready to advocated the paradox of perpetual peace between the States’ (written eight years before Kant’s Perpetual Peace). They argue that ‘Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other’: the Enlightenment Era version of the ‘Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention.’

Hamilton counters that republics, even commercial republics, are still just as likely to get into wars. Commerce, instead of eliminating causes of war, simply provides other incentives: war as commerce by other means. As evidence, he cites Sparta, Athens, Rome, Carthage – ‘the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction’, Venice, Holland, Britain, Austria, Bourbon, France, England and France involved in Austria vs. Bourbon, etc. In essence, if separate, composed as neighbors, states will fight. Here, he doesn’t offer any explicit evidence that states won’t fight even if they are united (and in fact his mentions of North Carolina’s revolt, the ‘late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania’ and the insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts makes me wonder that states will become embroiled in violence no matter what), except to quote Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, l’Abbé de Mably:

NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors.

The quote sums up the Paper nicely, as Hamilton notes with his final line: “This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY,” which I must assume he addresses in the next Paper, as there are only the two on Dissensions between the States.

Federalist Paper No. 4

In retrospect, Jay’s emphasis in No. 3 on just and unjust wars really was about not giving other nations just cause against America, through foolish actions on the part of individual states or citizens. Jay’s first line in No. 4 is clearer: ‘[the] just causes of war given to other nations’ (my emphasis).

Still, the second paragraph reaffirms my argument that Jay rejects- at least in the public formation of policy- the practices of realpolitik, and war as politics by other means. He doesn’t ignore that realism is a compelling theory of international relations, with powerful players, but he does diminish its legitimacy, calling the practice ‘disgraceful’ to human nature. I do think Jay- all the Founders, really- is trying to move America in a more idealistic direction, by redefining national interest to coincide more firmly with international interest. It’s a barely nascent line of thinking, but one that prevails throughout American political literature, and illustrated by history.

Returning to the Paper.
Jay warns Americans that not only do they need to protect themselves against causing unjust war, but also aggressors in unjust wars. If you remember, in No. 3, Jay fixed the causes of just war as primarily rising from the violation of treaties or direct violence- attack. Under this definition, those who would seek to use force to secure other goals would not have just cause.

Jay gives specific examples, drawn primarily from the pursuit of trade advantages. He mentions rivalries over fisheries (Britain and France) and navigation and shipping (most of the powers of Europe), particularly in shipping to China and India. Now, most people today would suggest using trade sanctions, quotas, subsidies and other mechanisms of economic soft power to diminish America’s advantage. Indeed, mercantilism was a well-understood economic policy, but it was seen more as a means to grow a nation’s wealth (and therefore military potential), rather than project power over other nations. However, and I could definitely be wrong about this; American history wasn’t my preferred topic of study in school; military power was still the primary tool of foreign influence. I’m pretty sure that is what Jay fears here, in part because of his early references to war, and also because he mentions Spain blocking the Mississippi and Britain the St. Lawrence, both of which could only be done and maintained- and defeated- by military might.

In such situations, with such inducements to war, the ‘best possible state of defense’ depends on the ‘government, the arms, and the resources of the country.’ And what form of government, what means of control of arms and resources, could best defend the country? Why, a unified national federation of course!

Jay’s arguments for unification:

1. Broader and deeper pool of resources- human, capital, natural, vegetable, animal, mineral. Not only the best leaders (Jay discussed peace/pre-war time leaders in No. 3, but focuses more on war time leaders here), but the best soldiers, and of course the necessary resources for war. (Paragraph 12)
2. Central authority for mobilizing, distributing and organizing resources- primarily military. (Paragraphs 12-16)
3. Central authority creating regulation- primarily for markets: trade, capital, credit, etc. Established, regulated, and stabilized markets strengthen the so-called “soft power” of a nation. (Mentioned in the last paragraph)

Pretty straightforward, with few surprises. These are the arguments I expected all along. But I’m definitely glad for where Jay took the last Paper.

One Paper left on the Dangers of Foreign Force and Influence: No. 5. Coming Shortly.

Federalist Paper No. 3

The title for the Federalist Paper No. 3 is ‘The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence’, so naturally Jay brings in themes from No. 2. He begins by reiterating that the ‘conventional wisdom’ of Americans is that of the ‘importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.’ As a writer, I love his sly (although really quite obvious) flattery: ‘the Americans, intelligent and well-informed’, for whom he has ‘great respect.’

Jay finally gets to the meat of the matter in this Paper (I suppose No. 2 could be considered his introduction?). Jay states that the first goal of reasonable people: securing their safety. He notes that threats can come from ‘foreign arms and influence’, as well as domestic causes. He chooses here to discuss the former, by examining ‘whether… a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords… the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.’

Jay begins, not with the possible threats faced by America, but with a meditation on just and unjust wars. Instead of questioning which formulation of state (national federation vs. various permutations of confederacy and independent states) will best muster a defensive army, he asks which will be more likely to give just causes of war.

The more I think about this approach, the more it astounds me. I suppose that the question of the capability to form a winning army is not strictly necessary, as only four years early the Americans had defeated the British, one of the greatest military powers in the world. Still, as Jay notes later, even at this early date, America had already signed treaties with six foreign nations (Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Portugal and Prussia), with all but Prussia maritime nations capable of conducting both naval battles and landing troops on American shores. Furthermore, both Britain and Spain were neighbors, with colonies flanking to the North and South. So despite the existence of treaties, the threat of violence, even just as small incursions by guerilla groups, remained fairly high. And yet, the early focus of this Paper is the morality of the possible conflicts, not their military outcome. Jay only returns the discussion to the question of federation vs. confederation in the 7^th paragraph:

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

The question in my mind now becomes: could this be an example of the genesis of American exceptionalism? America has been characterized as special from the very beginning: Winthrop’s famous, “City upon a Hill” sermon was given in 1630 (no, Reagan didn’t use it first), but the sentiments expressed here seem more in line with a rejection of Europe’s realpolitik. And yes, while I’ve known for quite some time that American foreign policy is often presented as idealistic and, if not more cooperative, than at least less expedient than that of ‘Old Europe’. (I think Kissinger’s Diplomacy devotes a whole chapter to Wilson’s perfection of this stereotyping of foreign policy). But I didn’t think, or at least had forgotten, that the idea started so early. However, Jay’s recommendations, while internationalist in nature, and morally-driven (really, state structure decided on the basis of the likelihood of venturing into a just war?), are no less self-serving than Bismarck’s. It’s just that Jay defines the good of the state differently. Bismarck and other realists view the national interest as roughly: territorial control and integrity, military and economic security, ready ability to project national power, and the means to increase and expand those components. Ok, excellent. Those measures make sense, given the world in which they developed. Jay doesn’t address those issues, at least not here. Here is his logic:

A national government is more efficient, and more appealing to men of character, who will then ‘not only consent to serve, but will also generally be appointed to manage it,’ and furthermore, these officials will be the best of the best, because a broader pool (the whole country vs. the individual state) will bring more qualified applicants together, and from there the people will be able to chose the MOST qualified: ‘[a] more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government….’ The result will be a government that is ‘more wise, systematical, and judicious’ than the individual states can afford, and consequently: 1. Other nations will be more satisfied with our leadership, and 2. American citizens will be safer, presumably as the enlightened government will respect our rights and security, and so work harder to secure both. He further argues this point in the next paragraph: under a national government, laws, both domestic and international (treaties) will apply equally to all citizens; judges will have consistent standards of appointment as well as enforcement of rulings, and so on. This is known as the ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause’ of the Constitution. Great, glad to have it. But what about those foreign forces and influences?

Well, all those temperamental little states, especially the borders states, might be tempted to ‘swerve from good faith and justice’, by, perhaps, picking a fight with Britain or Spain, or the Indian nations (I really love Jay’s statement that ‘Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions by the present federal government- here he means the confederate government under the Articles- the ‘feeble as it is’ is the clue’. He’s right, but oh so innocent). Even if the state leadership rejects the temptation, the state’s citizens may not. However, the state may not have the means, or truthfully, the desire, to punish those wayward citizens, and since these things have a way of spreading, suddenly there is another war on the continent, between, say, Maine, and Britain. Good going!

All of this makes a lot of sense- while there can be (especially in the realist school of thought) good reasons for inviting war, most people don’t usually want to. Jay’s logic is sound, if his paragraphs are occasionally a bit hard to follow. And again, by rejecting the discussion of wars prompted by intemperate grievances, Jay implies that this nation will literally chose its battles differently. He doesn’t explicitly dismiss realist reasons for war (presumably wars fought for the expansion of territory or national power aren’t intemperate), but he does imply, or at least allow the audience to infer, that those arguments will not influence national policy. American exceptionalism again.

Jay finishes this Paper by finally addressing the compelling argument that national unity = national strength. If the national government does get drawn into a conflict started wrongly by a state, America’s internal unity, and consequent strength, will be in a better position to offer ‘acknowledgements, explanations and compensations’. Little states are forced into pardon and humiliation by powerful nations, as Jay illustrates with the example of Genoa in 1685.

But why did Jay spend so much time discussing just vs. unjust wars? Where is the national interest? I feel that that little train of argument, so discussed in the first part of the Paper, doesn’t quite arrive in time for the end of it.

I can read into the text, and argue that not only will a national government be more temperate and so less likely to pick unprovoked fights, when it is forced into war by the aggressions of another state (defense is considered a just cause of war), it will have the court of public opinion on its side. But Jay doesn’t deliver that argument himself. He takes it for granted that just wars, and ensuring that those are the only type of war fought, are a sound argument. Which, hey, we’re Americans, so he’s not entirely wrong. But where does this attitude come from? Our religious and civil policies are already different from Britain; this we know, this is why we were founded. But when does the rejection of realist national military and diplomatic policy occur? Perhaps I’ve missed it and it’s no longer an issue by the time of the Constitution and Federalist Papers. I think not though. These Papers are part of the debate about American government and identity. Foreign policy intentions certainly fall into that.

I don’t think this topic is exhausted yet. Now I’m really curious as to what else I’ll find in the rest of the Papers.