Today in Federalism

April 2, 1788:

Federalist Paper No. 77, the last Paper to appear as a newspaper article, is published. The remaining Papers (78-85) were released in a bound volume containing Papers 37-85, on May 28.

Mark your calendars!

Federalist Paper No. 7

Poor Hamilton. He wishes he could just leave the question of what could make the states fight each other, at just: the same reasons every other group of states has ever fought against one another. But he needs to address the particulars of the American situation, so his ink can’t be spared.

The reasons he addresses are:

1. Territorial disputes (par. 2-4)
2. Competitions of commerce (par. 5-6)
3. Public debt of the Union (par. 7-8)
4. Laws in violation of private contracts (par. 9)

As he states, reasons 1 and 2 aren’t unique to America, but he does have reason to argue that 3 and 4 are.

By ‘public debt of the Union’, Hamilton refers primarily to the accumulated war debt. There are two problems he sees with leaving this debt to be dealt with by the single states:

1. The apportionment of debt: The different states accumulated different losses and costs based on their role in the Revolutionary war (heavier losses of human life, destruction of property, interruption of trade), in the pursuit of the common good – independence. How, then should the costs be apportioned – by the ability of each state to pay, by costs that were not paid out at the time, etc? Each state will obviously want to minimize its debt.
2. How to discharge the debt: Apparently, members of some of the states ‘either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question’ to paying ANY of the debt. On the other side, there are citizens who are creditors to the Revolutionary army and young nation, and really want to be paid back. Not to mention, some countries (France) lent the Americans money, and not paying back allies is a sure-fire way to make any support disappear.

The final point Hamilton raises is ‘laws in violation of private contracts’. I don’t follow this quite as easily, but my understanding is that a citizen of one state enters into a contract with a citizen of another state, after which the legislature of the first state passes some law that violates the contract between the two citizens, and injures the citizen of the second state. And since the citizen of the second state’ rights are violated, then his state will have to act to protect him, and now suddenly two states are having a go over this contract and the interfering law. In his example of Connecticut and Rhode Island, it almost seems as if Rhode Island’s legislature passed laws that would harm citizens of Connecticut on purpose, which doesn’t seem like a very neighborly thing to do. Or as Hamilton puts it, a ‘[breach] of moral obligation and social justice.’ (On a side note, no wonder he got into a duel with Aaron Burr)

As always, Hamilton says it better than I. From his conclusion:

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers…[T]his conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by…feeble tie… [would] be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions… would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers… Divide et impera must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.

Federalist Paper No. 6

Hamilton begins his second Federalist Paper with a brief review of the “innumerable” ‘causes of hostility among nations’. He also makes the rather snarky comment that

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other.

In other words, the idea of peace between separate or confederated states is a pipe dream.

I have to say, Hamilton was not the most optimistic guy. He had an unfailing lack of faith in people (and apparently, especially in women: ‘The influence which the bigotry of one female, the petulance of another, and the cabals of a third, had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.’). So, with this in mind, it’s not really surprising that he spends most of this Paper detailing historical evidence for the greed, vagaries and perfidies of people and states throughout history. He also rightly points out that it is not only statesmen who may determine a state’s peace, but the average citizen as well. He invokes recent (for him) history: Daniel Shays and his Regulators, noting, ‘If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.’

I should also probably note that despite Hamilton’s misgivings about statesmen, he concluded the ideal form of government had represented all the interest groups, but maintained a hereditary monarch to decide policy. In Hamilton's opinion, this was impractical in the United States; nevertheless, the country should mimic this form of government as closely as possible. He proposed, therefore, to have a President and elected Senators for life (surprising, really, that TJ and Madison couldn’t stand him).

I confess that I misread the seventh and eighth paragraphs the first three times. I thought that Hamilton was arguing that despite all of this, however, there is still hope! (which should have been my first clue that I was mistaken). In actuality, he says that visionary men ‘stand ready to advocated the paradox of perpetual peace between the States’ (written eight years before Kant’s Perpetual Peace). They argue that ‘Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other’: the Enlightenment Era version of the ‘Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention.’

Hamilton counters that republics, even commercial republics, are still just as likely to get into wars. Commerce, instead of eliminating causes of war, simply provides other incentives: war as commerce by other means. As evidence, he cites Sparta, Athens, Rome, Carthage – ‘the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction’, Venice, Holland, Britain, Austria, Bourbon, France, England and France involved in Austria vs. Bourbon, etc. In essence, if separate, composed as neighbors, states will fight. Here, he doesn’t offer any explicit evidence that states won’t fight even if they are united (and in fact his mentions of North Carolina’s revolt, the ‘late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania’ and the insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts makes me wonder that states will become embroiled in violence no matter what), except to quote Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, l’Abbé de Mably:

NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors.

The quote sums up the Paper nicely, as Hamilton notes with his final line: “This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY,” which I must assume he addresses in the next Paper, as there are only the two on Dissensions between the States.

Public Service Announcement

Words to blog by.

On the subject of breaks, Federalist Paper No. 6 is coming soon.

Federalist Paper No. 5

Jay recaps the general argument of the first set of Federalist Papers in paragraph two: ‘that weakness and divisions at home [will] invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing [will] tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves.’ In this last in the series on the Dangers from Foreign Force and Influences, Jay invokes the union of England and Scotland (part of what makes it the United Kingdom), the example with which the former colonists were ‘in general the best acquainted.’ He begins with Queen Anne’s appeal to the Scottish Parliament in 1706 to accept the proposed union. The predicted benefits:

An entire and perfect union… will secure… religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst [Scottish clans and regions], and the jealousies and differences betwixt [the] two kingdoms. It must increase… strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined… will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES.

In contrast, Jay reminds the reader of the island’s history before the union: divided into three nations, ‘almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.’ Despite their shared interests and common cause, at least with respect to the ‘continent’- Europe-, instead, mutual jealousies, often nursed by their very enemies in Europe, kept the island divided.

He then returns specifically to America. He asks directly: if America is divided into three or four different nations (confederations; we’ve already tried and failed at 13 individual states), won’t the result be the same as in Britain? Although he couches it in terms of ‘envy’, what Jay is really describing in the fifth through seventh paragraphs is the possibility of unstable balance of power, resulting in an arms or trade race, but importantly, ‘formidable only to each other.’ Not exactly a future worthy of a country that defeated Britain.

Jay also addresses the possible counter-argument, that the confederacies will form defense unions. He challenges the reader to name such a time when the independent states combined in an alliance and united their forces against a foreign enemy. This line actually confuses me. Wasn’t that what they did with the Revolutionary War? Perhaps Britain wasn’t a foreign enemy, because it was the colonizing power?*

He also raises the point that should the confederacies go to war with each other, they may be tempted to reach out to foreign nations for assistance, but these powers, once received, could then turn on their American allies to conquer, as the Romans did millennia before.

Jay debates the subject of the Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence through four consecutive Papers. His work sometimes tiptoes this side of specious, being more convinced of his own rightness than in presenting a fully fledged argument, but, especially in the latter Papers, with their wealth of historical examples, he does present a strong argument.

This is also the last of Jay until Paper No. 64, when he returns to discuss the Powers of the Senate. Next, we’ll explore the problem of Dissensions between the States, and reintroduce Alexander Hamilton.

* A friend offers this interpretation: "I think he is asking, rhetorically, when Britain and Spain, which had formerly been divided (Britain consisted of Scotland, Wales, etc., and before that England was just the name of land mass that contained the kingdoms of Mercia, Wessex, Northumbria, etc., and before it was united Spain contained Aragon and other kingdoms) opted to form the loose kind of confederation that anti-Federalists preferred. The answer, he implies, is that they did not. They formed strong unions that allowed them to repel foreign invaders."

So, basically a restatement of his previous points, with more historical evidence.

Federalist Paper No. 4

In retrospect, Jay’s emphasis in No. 3 on just and unjust wars really was about not giving other nations just cause against America, through foolish actions on the part of individual states or citizens. Jay’s first line in No. 4 is clearer: ‘[the] just causes of war given to other nations’ (my emphasis).

Still, the second paragraph reaffirms my argument that Jay rejects- at least in the public formation of policy- the practices of realpolitik, and war as politics by other means. He doesn’t ignore that realism is a compelling theory of international relations, with powerful players, but he does diminish its legitimacy, calling the practice ‘disgraceful’ to human nature. I do think Jay- all the Founders, really- is trying to move America in a more idealistic direction, by redefining national interest to coincide more firmly with international interest. It’s a barely nascent line of thinking, but one that prevails throughout American political literature, and illustrated by history.

Returning to the Paper.
Jay warns Americans that not only do they need to protect themselves against causing unjust war, but also aggressors in unjust wars. If you remember, in No. 3, Jay fixed the causes of just war as primarily rising from the violation of treaties or direct violence- attack. Under this definition, those who would seek to use force to secure other goals would not have just cause.

Jay gives specific examples, drawn primarily from the pursuit of trade advantages. He mentions rivalries over fisheries (Britain and France) and navigation and shipping (most of the powers of Europe), particularly in shipping to China and India. Now, most people today would suggest using trade sanctions, quotas, subsidies and other mechanisms of economic soft power to diminish America’s advantage. Indeed, mercantilism was a well-understood economic policy, but it was seen more as a means to grow a nation’s wealth (and therefore military potential), rather than project power over other nations. However, and I could definitely be wrong about this; American history wasn’t my preferred topic of study in school; military power was still the primary tool of foreign influence. I’m pretty sure that is what Jay fears here, in part because of his early references to war, and also because he mentions Spain blocking the Mississippi and Britain the St. Lawrence, both of which could only be done and maintained- and defeated- by military might.

In such situations, with such inducements to war, the ‘best possible state of defense’ depends on the ‘government, the arms, and the resources of the country.’ And what form of government, what means of control of arms and resources, could best defend the country? Why, a unified national federation of course!

Jay’s arguments for unification:

1. Broader and deeper pool of resources- human, capital, natural, vegetable, animal, mineral. Not only the best leaders (Jay discussed peace/pre-war time leaders in No. 3, but focuses more on war time leaders here), but the best soldiers, and of course the necessary resources for war. (Paragraph 12)
2. Central authority for mobilizing, distributing and organizing resources- primarily military. (Paragraphs 12-16)
3. Central authority creating regulation- primarily for markets: trade, capital, credit, etc. Established, regulated, and stabilized markets strengthen the so-called “soft power” of a nation. (Mentioned in the last paragraph)

Pretty straightforward, with few surprises. These are the arguments I expected all along. But I’m definitely glad for where Jay took the last Paper.

One Paper left on the Dangers of Foreign Force and Influence: No. 5. Coming Shortly.

Federalist Paper No. 3

The title for the Federalist Paper No. 3 is ‘The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence’, so naturally Jay brings in themes from No. 2. He begins by reiterating that the ‘conventional wisdom’ of Americans is that of the ‘importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.’ As a writer, I love his sly (although really quite obvious) flattery: ‘the Americans, intelligent and well-informed’, for whom he has ‘great respect.’

Jay finally gets to the meat of the matter in this Paper (I suppose No. 2 could be considered his introduction?). Jay states that the first goal of reasonable people: securing their safety. He notes that threats can come from ‘foreign arms and influence’, as well as domestic causes. He chooses here to discuss the former, by examining ‘whether… a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords… the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.’

Jay begins, not with the possible threats faced by America, but with a meditation on just and unjust wars. Instead of questioning which formulation of state (national federation vs. various permutations of confederacy and independent states) will best muster a defensive army, he asks which will be more likely to give just causes of war.

The more I think about this approach, the more it astounds me. I suppose that the question of the capability to form a winning army is not strictly necessary, as only four years early the Americans had defeated the British, one of the greatest military powers in the world. Still, as Jay notes later, even at this early date, America had already signed treaties with six foreign nations (Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Portugal and Prussia), with all but Prussia maritime nations capable of conducting both naval battles and landing troops on American shores. Furthermore, both Britain and Spain were neighbors, with colonies flanking to the North and South. So despite the existence of treaties, the threat of violence, even just as small incursions by guerilla groups, remained fairly high. And yet, the early focus of this Paper is the morality of the possible conflicts, not their military outcome. Jay only returns the discussion to the question of federation vs. confederation in the 7^th paragraph:

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

The question in my mind now becomes: could this be an example of the genesis of American exceptionalism? America has been characterized as special from the very beginning: Winthrop’s famous, “City upon a Hill” sermon was given in 1630 (no, Reagan didn’t use it first), but the sentiments expressed here seem more in line with a rejection of Europe’s realpolitik. And yes, while I’ve known for quite some time that American foreign policy is often presented as idealistic and, if not more cooperative, than at least less expedient than that of ‘Old Europe’. (I think Kissinger’s Diplomacy devotes a whole chapter to Wilson’s perfection of this stereotyping of foreign policy). But I didn’t think, or at least had forgotten, that the idea started so early. However, Jay’s recommendations, while internationalist in nature, and morally-driven (really, state structure decided on the basis of the likelihood of venturing into a just war?), are no less self-serving than Bismarck’s. It’s just that Jay defines the good of the state differently. Bismarck and other realists view the national interest as roughly: territorial control and integrity, military and economic security, ready ability to project national power, and the means to increase and expand those components. Ok, excellent. Those measures make sense, given the world in which they developed. Jay doesn’t address those issues, at least not here. Here is his logic:

A national government is more efficient, and more appealing to men of character, who will then ‘not only consent to serve, but will also generally be appointed to manage it,’ and furthermore, these officials will be the best of the best, because a broader pool (the whole country vs. the individual state) will bring more qualified applicants together, and from there the people will be able to chose the MOST qualified: ‘[a] more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government….’ The result will be a government that is ‘more wise, systematical, and judicious’ than the individual states can afford, and consequently: 1. Other nations will be more satisfied with our leadership, and 2. American citizens will be safer, presumably as the enlightened government will respect our rights and security, and so work harder to secure both. He further argues this point in the next paragraph: under a national government, laws, both domestic and international (treaties) will apply equally to all citizens; judges will have consistent standards of appointment as well as enforcement of rulings, and so on. This is known as the ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause’ of the Constitution. Great, glad to have it. But what about those foreign forces and influences?

Well, all those temperamental little states, especially the borders states, might be tempted to ‘swerve from good faith and justice’, by, perhaps, picking a fight with Britain or Spain, or the Indian nations (I really love Jay’s statement that ‘Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions by the present federal government- here he means the confederate government under the Articles- the ‘feeble as it is’ is the clue’. He’s right, but oh so innocent). Even if the state leadership rejects the temptation, the state’s citizens may not. However, the state may not have the means, or truthfully, the desire, to punish those wayward citizens, and since these things have a way of spreading, suddenly there is another war on the continent, between, say, Maine, and Britain. Good going!

All of this makes a lot of sense- while there can be (especially in the realist school of thought) good reasons for inviting war, most people don’t usually want to. Jay’s logic is sound, if his paragraphs are occasionally a bit hard to follow. And again, by rejecting the discussion of wars prompted by intemperate grievances, Jay implies that this nation will literally chose its battles differently. He doesn’t explicitly dismiss realist reasons for war (presumably wars fought for the expansion of territory or national power aren’t intemperate), but he does imply, or at least allow the audience to infer, that those arguments will not influence national policy. American exceptionalism again.

Jay finishes this Paper by finally addressing the compelling argument that national unity = national strength. If the national government does get drawn into a conflict started wrongly by a state, America’s internal unity, and consequent strength, will be in a better position to offer ‘acknowledgements, explanations and compensations’. Little states are forced into pardon and humiliation by powerful nations, as Jay illustrates with the example of Genoa in 1685.

But why did Jay spend so much time discussing just vs. unjust wars? Where is the national interest? I feel that that little train of argument, so discussed in the first part of the Paper, doesn’t quite arrive in time for the end of it.

I can read into the text, and argue that not only will a national government be more temperate and so less likely to pick unprovoked fights, when it is forced into war by the aggressions of another state (defense is considered a just cause of war), it will have the court of public opinion on its side. But Jay doesn’t deliver that argument himself. He takes it for granted that just wars, and ensuring that those are the only type of war fought, are a sound argument. Which, hey, we’re Americans, so he’s not entirely wrong. But where does this attitude come from? Our religious and civil policies are already different from Britain; this we know, this is why we were founded. But when does the rejection of realist national military and diplomatic policy occur? Perhaps I’ve missed it and it’s no longer an issue by the time of the Constitution and Federalist Papers. I think not though. These Papers are part of the debate about American government and identity. Foreign policy intentions certainly fall into that.

I don’t think this topic is exhausted yet. Now I’m really curious as to what else I’ll find in the rest of the Papers.

Federalist Paper No. 2

As an exegesis of the Federalist Papers, or even just an argument in favor of them, No. 2 isn’t particularly strong. I probably would have gotten marked down for writing something this flimsy in high school. It’s not that Jay doesn’t have good arguments in favor of the Constitution, it’s just that he doesn’t make them. Instead, this Paper consists almost entirely of assumptions, implications, and the reputations of others.

The first 14 Papers generally cover the “Utility of the Union for your political prosperity” (see A Short History of the Federalist Papers). Their argument is that the “Constitution… [is] for the sake of the of the Union, and the Union… [is] for the sake of safety or self-preservation” (Kesler, Introduction, xvii). In this vein, Jay begins with the statement: “Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government.” This line wouldn’t have been likely to garner much disagreement. The Founding Fathers were working on the shoulders of the philosophers Hobbes and Locke, who argued that humanity existed in a ‘state of nature’ (resulting in a life that was ‘nasty, brutish and short’) without a government to moderate our baser instincts. This is the idea behind the ‘social contract’, which Jay references almost as a sidebar: the people will need to divest some of their natural rights to the government, in order to secure some protection. So far so good. The radicalism of the Constitution wasn’t the creation of a government, per se, but its structure.

The federated unity of the proposed government is the most important part of the Constitution, and the defense. Some had suggested creating several confederacies, each holding the powers suggested for the single national government. Jay dismisses the merits of that suggestion outright. He makes the point that prior to the War, the former colonies had been convinced of the necessity of unity (remember the political cartoon "Join or Die" from elementary school?). Indeed, it was the colonies united efforts which allowed them to win the Revolutionary War.

Still, the supporters of confederacies must have had some reasonable arguments, yes? Well, perhaps. But we’ll never know just from reading this Paper. Jay doesn’t address them. Instead, he paints a picture of a united people occupying a united land. In addition to the emotional response it stirs, it also hints at important economic truths: in a world still dominated by agriculture and horse/wind power, extensive and varied lands for crops/livestock combined with navigable rivers and safe ports produced a powerful economy. But remember also that NJ and NY and Massachusetts used to fight over tariffs, shipping costs, port fees, etc., costing farmers and merchants alike. A unitary and singular trade policy that allowed the free flow of goods between the states, and instead directed all mercantilist policies towards Europe, would yield substantial dividends.

It should be noted, that Jay takes a few rhetorical liberties here. The colonies had never had the same religion: Massachusetts was founded by the Puritans, who were Calvinist; Virginia was founded as a nominally Anglican colony. Even if one was to argue that both colonies were Protestant, don’t forget that Maryland was established as a Catholic colony (and while all are Christian sects, try explaining that to those who feared that the ‘Papists’ would subvert the American traits suspicion of authority and separation of church and state). Still, it’s a very nice paragraph.

Jay then returns to his previous point about how Americans used to believe that we needed to be united to survive. The very best minds had been convinced of it, and the people had believed their leaders. And now the very best have again come together, and produced a unifying Constitution, so the people need to believe their leaders again. Really, this piece is more a defense of the Convention by way of defending the First Continental Congress (Jay’s Congress of 1774). The Congress was formed in response to the Intolerable Acts passed by the British Parliament. Patrick Henry wanted to form a new government, but several conservative members (including Jay) supported a Plan of Union. That Plan was rejected, but the Congress did sign the Articles of Association (AoA) which intended to modify the colonial government, in part through the threat of boycott. In the AoA, the colonies declare their allegiance to the king, but state that Parliament’s actions are unacceptable. They state their grievances, and the consequences of not rectifying those complaints. Most importantly, in the last paragraph, the delegates swear: “And we do solemnly bind ourselves and our constituents”. Union! at least of a sorts. Not long after, the Declaration of Independence is signed, and history is made.

The readers of the Federalist Papers would have been familiar with this background, as it would have been recent events for them, rather than our history. Still, I stand by my original statement: No. 2 is a rather flimsy argument. As far as I can tell, after several re-readings, Jay doesn’t mention the Dangers of Foreign Force and Influence as the title suggests. In fact, he does very little to address the particular merits of either union or confederacy, stating instead: “I am persuaded in my own mind.” There are arguments to be found referenced throughout the text, but they are not explicit. The political nature of the Federalist Papers is made clear here, if it is more understated elsewhere.

Some final points: yes, in the 8^th paragraph, when Jay refers to the institution of a ‘federal government’, he is referring to the Articles of Confederation- clearly not a federal government in our current understanding of the word. Unfortunately for the beginning reader, the authors of the Federalist Papers, were rather casual with their use of ‘federation’ vs. ‘confederation’- the words are used interchangeably. Usually, the context removes any doubts about the intended meaning/current interpretation, but I’ll do my best to catch any occurrences and clarify them. Here, Jay’s point is that the Confederation was flawed and that a less hasty and more deliberate consideration of government has yielded a less flawed proposal.

And just for a bit of fun (a professor of mine used to introduce such tidbits with, ‘historically speaking’), the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention were not ‘cool’ in any sense of the word, except possibly for the terms of some relationships afterwards. They took place in the summer in Philadelphia (a beautiful city, but not the most pleasant in the summer, especially without air conditioning), and most every day that the Convention met featured at least one hot-tempered debate. (For a fascinating retelling of that summer, read the excellent The Great Rehearsal).

Federalist Paper No. 1 (a brief entry)

Initially, the most difficult part of reading the Federalist Papers is the language. Antiquated English is not the easiest to wade through, especially not while also contending with such heady stuff as the foundational philosophy of an entirely new form of government, one that is consciously established after ‘reflection and choice’, and not merely the result of ‘accident and force’. That is one of the subtexts of this introduction: ‘My fellow Americans!’ Publius says, ‘we have the opportunity here to choose our own government, not only the members thereof, but also the manner in which we will be governed, for the second time (the first time not having worked out so well)! So let’s make it a good one!’

Others, like George Clinton, Governor of New York, stood to lose too much power and profit if a national government was allowed to function. Hamilton, as a delegate from New York, no doubt had Clinton in mind when he made his sometimes disparaging remarks about the Constitution’s detractors.

However, he does make hint that the next of the Papers will deal with the size of the proposed union, and especially the case that a large and powerful Union is the only way to prevent undue foreign influence- a sensitive subject for a people who had fought to win their independence from a country many had never visited.

So that is more or less the Federalist Paper No. 1: an appeal to the good sense of the People of New York, the admittance that not all who doubted the Constitution were acting out of their own self-interest, but rather for the public good, disgust at and warnings of those who were only self-interested, the thesis of the Federalist Papers, and the preview of the next installment.

A Short History of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are a collection of essays (85 in total so get comfortable) written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, under the pen name 'Publius' in order to urge the ratification of the proposed Constitution. By the time the first Federalist Paper was published on October 27, 1787, the public debate was already over a month old, and the internal debate at the Constitutional Convention had begun over six months earlier.

Although addressed to the People of New York, the Federalist Papers were republished in other states and used by Federalists to persuade their respective states as well. The Federalist Papers did often need to address current particular concerns, but they followed the overall thesis stated in the first Paper.

Originally sent to amend the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia Delegation (of which Madison was a part), with the aid of like-minded delegates (including Hamilton, delegate from New York), instead proposed replacing the Articles with a new, more centralized government. Members of the smaller states feared they would be overwhelmed by the economic and political power of Virginia and New York, as well as the growing Southern and Western territories, at first refused to discuss a closer union. However, eventually the idea of a federal government- with powers given to both the states and a stronger national government- emerged. This federated form of government was not only a departure from the contemporary government, federalism itself was also a radically different philosophy and style of governance, influenced by the writings of Locke and Hobbes, as well as the still recent Revolutionary War and the events that provoked it. The written Constitution comprised of a combination of their hopes, fears, and best guesses.

(For a history of the Constitutional Convention, read the excellent books The Great Rehearsal and Miracle at Philadelphia. For an explanation of federalism as both a philosophy and a style of governance check out CGS' overview of federalism.)

Not all of the delegates accepted the proposed Constitution and several refused to sign it. These delegates led the charges against ratification.

Although collectively known as the Anti-Federalists, the detractors of the Constitution listed several different complaints. The most common fear was that the executive of the national government would develop into a monarchy, or perhaps combine with the legislature into a tyrannical aristocracy. A Bill of Rights was seen by many (including George Mason, a Convention delegate, and Patrick Henry) as the only way to protect personal rights- essential to a people who had recently fought a war for ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’, and its absence was a major obstacle to their support. Other objections included the acceptance of slavery into the Constitution- the infamous 3/5ths compromise, whereby slaves were counted towards representation in the House. This was a necessary compromise, as the southern states of South Carolina and Georgia absolutely wouldn’t have joined, but still a rather onerous one. Some felt that the size of the territory of the states would make governing impossible, and that that was the real reason for the failure of the Confederation, but that several smaller Confederacies might succeed.

The result was that not only did Hamilton (and Jay and Madison) have to prove that the Union was a viable form of government and better than the Articles, but that a change from the Articles was necessary. In order to address all of these issues, Hamilton laid out his thesis in 6 parts:

The utility of the Union to your political
prosperity
The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that
Union
The necessity of a government at least equally energetic to the one
proposed, to the attainment of this object
The conformity of the proposed
Constitution to the true principles of republican government
Its analogy to
your own State constitution
and lastly
The additional security
which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of
government, to liberty, and to property.

The first three subjects deal with the necessity of a Union, both for survival and the attainment of liberty and are covered in the first 36 Papers. The second three discuss the merits of the proposed Constitution, and make up the remainder of the Papers (37-85